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Abstract
In this paper we examine the role of reputation in the behavior of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Can the pursuit and maintenance of a
reputation cause NGOs to change their behavior in meaningful ways? Or are the
norms and institutions that motivate and govern NGOs the sole drivers of behav-
ior? To answer these questions, we focus on the relationship between NGOs and
their donors. Our theoretical model reveals that reputation can be a key piece of
information in the decision to fund the activities of a non-governmental organi-
zation. Indeed, reputation can become so important to the survival of the NGO
that it interferes with the long-term policy goals of the organization. The result-
ing short-term NGO behavior is often misconstrued as incompetent or ine!cient,
but it is actually motivated by the structural constraints of the relationship with
donors. We illustrate this strategic dynamic here with a focus on three types
of NGO activity: international crisis mediation, ameliorating poverty, and water
improvement.
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In this paper we examine the role of reputation in the behavior of non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs). There is ample anecdotal evidence that indicates that NGOs care
deeply about their reputations. Often the argument is made that both NGOs and their
state-centered counterparts, intergovernmental organizations, rely on legitimacy as political
currency. Lacking the classic mechanisms of power a"orded to states, these organizations
need alternate sources of influence. A solid and well communicated reputation perhaps o"ers
an NGO such an alternate foundation to help it succeed in its goals.
The origins and influence of reputations, however, can only truly be understood in the
context of interaction with others. Can the pursuit and maintenance of a reputation cause
NGOs to change their behavior in meaningful ways, or are the norms and institutions that
motivate and govern NGOs the sole drivers of behavior? To answer these questions, we focus
our attention on the relationship between NGOs and their donors. We focus here on NGOs
that are not self-sustaining, which means they rely upon grants and donations to fuel their
budgets. Donors are defined as the principals who seek to fund agents (in this case, the
NGOs) to accomplish policy goals on their behalf. The NGO-donor relationship is crucial
to the existence and choices made by the internal governing body of any NGO that is not
self-sustaining.
To focus on this NGO-donor dynamic, we develop a model of the interaction between
donors and NGOs within the broad framework of a principal-agent problem. NGOs face
constant pressure to maintain revenues from donors in order to survive and pursue policy
goals. Donors, on the other hand, face the di!cult task of investing wisely in NGOs that
are capable of policy success. Reputation has an important role in this principal-agent
dynamic. By shifting our attention to the strategic dynamics of the NGO-donor relationship,
we find NGOs can have incentives to pursue strategies that maximize their reputations for
competence in the eyes of their donors. These incentives can trigger important changes
in performance (both real and demonstrated) and help us understand why NGOs struggle
to balance their intrinsic motivations with the strategic imperatives that result from donor
dependence.
Competent NGOs are those that are able to use the resources provided by the donors
to achieve real, tangible progress toward policy goals.1 Competence, however, is not easily
observed by donors, nor is it a stable condition. Policy successes, even short-term ones,
provide meaningful signals of competence to donors. Donors then reward these signals with
funds. A competent NGO will invest significant resources in the maintenance of its repu-
tation, and the possibility of changes in competence means donors never stop caring about
this reputation. In a world of uncertainty, reputation becomes an important part of the
NGO-donor relationship that a"ects the activities of NGOs fundamentally.
The constant need to maintain a reputation for competence can constrain the focus of
NGOs to the short term. The resulting myopic focus on small goals that are quickly and
visibly accomplished can seemingly undermine the pursuit of the central goals of the NGO.
What appears from the outside as incompetence is actually the opposite. Acting rationally,
high quality NGOs and donors find themselves in what we term a “reputation trap.” To sur-
vive financially, NGOs become frustratingly hobbled by their need to continuously produce
tangible results to maintain their reputations. By requiring NGOs to provide such signals
of their competence, donors do not aim to impede long-term policy successes. Rather, they
simply wish to maximize the potency of their resources by only funding the “right” agents.
Calls for transparency and accountability, long the hallmark of reform calls for NGOs, will
not address these problems. Only by changing the structure of the NGO-donor relationship
will these actors be able to escape the reputation trap and focus their a greater proportion
of their e"orts to long-term policy success.
We illustrate this strategic dynamic here with a focus on three types of NGO activity:
international crisis mediation, water improvement, and ameliorating poverty. International
mediation is a classically noble cause, emerging from the norms and institutions of non-violent
conflict resolution in the international system (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009; Beardsley 2011;
1The conditions that define successful progress are a function of the task at hand, the NGO’s preferences,
and donors’ preferences.
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Diehl and Grieg 2012). Using the insights of the model, we evaluate the behavior of the
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) in its first attempts to secure peace in Aceh in
1999. As the HDC worked to produce cease-fire agreements in the Acehnese conflict, it also
sought to establish its image and credibility as a competent, e"ective mediator. HDC’s policy
successes ultimately fell short of a durable peace, but proved to be su!cient to establish
HDC’s reputation as a successful mediator. We then highlight the short-term implications of
the reputation trap, focusing on the challenges faced by NGOs in pursuit of improving water
access and clean water. Water safety and access has emerged as one of the most pernicious
problems of the 21st century. Water NGOs have ambitiously tackled these problems, but too
often they are forced to settle for reporting the number of bore holes they produce instead
of focusing their e"orts on more permanent solutions.
Finally, we discuss the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) to illustrate
the dynamic mechanics of our model as well as potential policy solutions to the reputation
trap. The goal of ameliorating poverty ranks as one of the most pressing and salient activities
of our age. The BRAC originated in the early 1970s with the goal of improving education,
employment, and welfare of the poorest citizens of Bangladesh. BRAC’s leadership stability
has decelerated the decay of its historical reputation, and in recent years the BRAC has been
able to balance its dependence on donors with self-sustaining funds. These two factors have
partially mitigated BRAC’s reputation trap and point to potential policy prescriptions for
addressing these types of incentive problems faced by other NGOs.
Reputation
The literature on reputation in international relations first began to develop within the
extensive works on deterrence theory (Schelling 1966). Theories of reputation, however,
have evolved far beyond their original conceptions. Mercer (1996) pushed for a broader
understanding of reputation, one that would apply beyond the Cold War notion of the term.
Essential to Mercer’s definition of reputation is that an observer uses dispositional attributes
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to explain the future behavior of others. Dispositional attributes such as reliability, resolve,
or competence are expected to be valid regardless of the situation. Copeland (1997), however,
extends the definition of reputation further to include situational factors, explaining behavior
based on context; what one actor does in a particular scenario, most others would do as
well. Beyond the debate over dispositional versus situational attributions, a more general
definition of reputation can arise. Reputation describes a phenomenon where actors: (1)
learn from and interpret observations and then update their beliefs, and (2) use updated
beliefs to influence their international behavior (Jervis 1976; Levy 1994; Crescenzi 2007).
Reputation serves two primary functions in international politics. First, actors strive to
build a reputation because it gives them the ability to separate or distinguish themselves
from the crowd. For example, Bercovitch and Schneider (2000, 146) describe how mediators
are “interested in the prestige that they could gain from successful mediations.” Mediators
who seek a reputation are trying to establish that they are more capable than alternative
actors. In this way, international mediators behave in much the same way as firms. Mailath
and Samuelson (1998; 2001) assert that while firms have short-term incentives to exert low
e"ort, they would earn higher profits in the long run if they would commit to high e"ort
instead. Reputation provides a mechanism that allows firms to signal that they are worth
the investment; competent firms expend extra e"ort to maintain a reputation that sets them
apart from inept firms. In our analysis, we examine how NGOs have similar incentives to
build and maintain a reputation for competence in order to guarantee continued funding
from donors.
Reputation also serves a second function for actors: it disseminates information about
future behavior (Walter 2003; 2006). Actors synthesize these observations and perceptions
over time, creating their own realities (Jervis 1988, 694). They absorb information and learn
from it; as such, reputations have the ability to alter future behavior. This reputational
information has been shown to influence state decisions about conflict behavior, escalation to
war, and alliance formation (Crescenzi 2007; Crescenzi, Kathman and Long 2007; Crescenzi
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et al. 2012). We investigate the extent to which this kind of information dissemination is
relevant for the decisions NGOs make about their own behavior. Our intuition is that that
reputation may be even more important for NGOs than it is for states, particularly with
they do not possess internal mechanisms for financial survival.
As a phenomenon that is largely based on observations and perceptions, reputation is
generally considered to be an abstract concept. Given its abstract nature, reputation’s
importance is not universally accepted. Press (2004), for example, states that the scholarly
research that hails reputation as a key variable in decisions and actions is “based on a dubious
leap from behavior in daily life to decision-making in life-and-death crises” (139). Press
urges that leaders use current calculations in times of crisis to make decisions; reputational
information has no presence in their decision-making. The assertion that reputation is an
irrelevant variable for the behavior and decisions of actors is ultimately an empirical question,
but before that question can be accurately examined we need to have a logically consistent
argument that ties reputational information to political behavior.
Lastly, a reputation is dynamic; it is subject to both gradual changes and sudden shocks
that lead to rapid updating. Reputation evolves for several reasons including but not lim-
ited to leadership changes, new experiences, and/or missed opportunities. Older information
about reputation holds less weight than newer information when it comes time to make deci-
sions. Newer information is more relevant than the distant past because newer information
generates signals that better reflect the current reputation of an actor. Actors recognize the
impact that time has on reputation, and they have an incentive to continually work at main-
taining their reputation over time. In the case of NGOs, the potential for high variability
in sta" and resources can accelerate the degradation of old information. In the theory we
develop below, we take these temporal dynamics into account.
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NGO Accountability
While the success or failure of NGOs in the broader category of international organizations
has been widely examined in the international relations literature, this discussion typically
focuses on the existence, utility, and performance of NGOs. These lines of research have
roots in grand theory debates (Waltz 1979; Keohane 1984), and more recently, scholars have
examined NGOs from a sociological perspective (Finnemore 1996; Barnett and Finnemore
1999; 2004; Sundstrom 2005). Typically, these studies focus on the role of the NGO in the
international system, its objectivity or autonomy from states in the system, or the ability
of the NGO to have an impact in world politics. Norms and the socio-political environment
shape or construct the emergence, goals, and activities of NGOs, often encouraging (or
constraining) these organizations to engage in behavior that may appear to be irrational or
subjective.
To examine the role of reputation in NGO behavior, however, we turn to reputational
theories of the firm (Kreps and Wilson 1982; Milgrom and Roberts 1982; Fudenberg and
Levine 1989; 1992; Mailath and Samuelson 1998; 2001). Although NGOs are not profit-
driven enterprises, they have substantial similarities with firms. Cooley and Ron (2002) argue
that NGOs respond to contractual incentives and organizational pressures much like firms
in markets. Although NGOs might not be profit driven, the need to secure a steady source
of funding and contracts shapes their decision-making process and actions within the NGO
market. Thus, the NGO market operates with similar competitive pressures encouraging
NGOs to actually compete with each other instead of work together toward a common goal.
Johnson and Prakash (2007) identify similarities between the donor-NGO relationship
and the stockholder-firm relationship. Primarily, both relationships are plagued by the same
principal-agent problem. Just as stockholders and firms share the common goal of maximiz-
ing profits, donors and NGOs are also connected by a common goal. Such a principal-agent
focus on NGOs and their donors has received criticism in the past. Barnett and Finnemore
(1999) argue that the principal-agent framework is inappropriate because the donor and the
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organization have the same preferences, but an assumption that donor and NGO prefer-
ences are identical is incomplete and problematic. While the donors and NGOs have similar
enough preferences to work together (like firms and stakeholders), donors still have to worry
about the e!cient use of resources as well as any short-term divergences in preferences.
While there are many advantages to working through or with NGOs, identifying e"ective
NGOs can be a di!cult task for donors (Boulding 2009). Many high quality NGOs recog-
nize this di!culty and attempt to signal their quality to potential donors by taking costly
actions such as creating and joining voluntary accountability and standard setting programs
(Gugerty 2009; Reinhardt 2009). Given that many of the activities of NGOs are not observed
by donors, uncertainty about the e"ectiveness of NGOs often continues to persist even after
the donor-NGO relationship is established. To alleviate potential principal-agent problems
that could result from such uncertainty, donors and NGOs often turn to the establishment
of accountability mechanisms. Accountability refers to “the means by which individuals and
organizations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for
their actions” (Edwards and Hulme 1996, 967). To resolve information asymmetries, NGOs
typically generate product data, such as standardized reports, that are transmitted to donors
(Ebrahim 2002). In practice, these tools, which include disclosure reports and performance
assessments, are the primary means by which NGOs are held accountable to their donors
(Ebrahim 2003).
Of course, NGOs can be potentially accountable to many di"erent actors, including
donors, clients, and themselves. However, in practice, NGOs have primarily focused on “up-
ward” and “external” accountability to donors, largely ignoring accountability to other actors
(Najam 1996; Ebrahim 2003). In addition to the actor they target, accountability measures
vary in the organizational responses they engender. Functional mechanisms account for re-
sources, resource use, and immediate impacts, while strategic mechanisms account for the
impacts that an NGO’s activities have on the actions of other organizations and the wider
environment (Najam 1996; Ebrahim 2003). Empirically, NGOs have placed more emphasis
7
on the former measures, which lead them to prioritize short-term goals. For this reason,
many scholars and practitioners have argued that a focus on functional accountability to
donors has led to organizational practices that do not e"ectively achieve the long-term polit-
ical and social goals of NGOs (Najam 1996; Ebrahim 2003; 2005; Jordan 2005; O’Dwyer and
Unerman 2007; 2008). Nevertheless, despite the potentially poor long-term consequences, we
do observe that NGOs and donors commonly implement functional accountability measures.
The theoretical model developed in the next section aims to explain why and when NGOs
and donors would rationally choose to do so. Later, in our discussion of the empirical be-
havior of international NGOs in several issue areas, we explore the potential inter-temporal
tradeo"s that can result from the establishment of such accountability schemes.
Theoretical Model
Our theoretical model focuses on the principal-agent relationship between a donor and a
non-governmental organization. The donor chooses whether to fund an NGO to pursue
a particular policy. If the NGO receives funding, it decides how much e"ort to put into
achieving the donor’s proposed policy versus pursuing other activities. Like many game-
theoretic models of reputation, we assume that the principal is uncertain about both the
type and the actions of the agent (Fudenberg and Levine 1992; Mailath and Samuelson 2001).
First, the donor does not know the competence level of the NGO. This can potentially lead
to adverse selection, in which the donor funds an incompetent NGO that cannot produce
successful policy outcomes. Second, while the donor can observe the policy outcomes of
the NGO’s activities, it cannot observe the level of e"ort exerted by the NGO. This can
potentially lead to moral hazard, in which the NGO puts little e"ort into achieving the
donor’s goals because its funding is not dependent upon its e"ort level.
Unlike many of the canonical game-theoretic models of reputation (e.g. Kreps and Wilson
1982; Milgrom and Roberts 1982; Fudenberg and Levine 1989; 1992), we do not allow for the
possibility that the agent is a “commitment” type who will always exert high e"ort. In such
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models, ordinary agents maintain a reputation by mimicking such commitment types. This
“negative” conceptualization of reputation, which implies that agents are rewarded with a
good reputation by pretending to be someone that they are not, appears inconsistent with
our understanding of how reputations are developed empirically. Instead, our model only
allows for the possibility that the agent is an incompetent type that is unable to (or is never
willing to) exert high e"ort. Thus, competent agents develop and maintain a reputation
by separating from incompetent types. In this “positive” conceptualization of reputation,
agents earn a good reputation by demonstrating to others who they really are.
Mailath and Samuelson (1998; 2001) demonstrate that the creation of a reputation
through separation requires perpetual uncertainty about the agent’s type. In our model,
we allow for the possibility that the NGO’s level of competence changes over time through
exogenous shake-ups. These exogenous shake-ups can take on several forms. Perhaps the
director of the organization has retired, handing over the NGO to new leadership. On the
opposite end, large turnover among sta" could decrease the competence and e!ciency of the
organization as new sta" is trained. Additionally, new technology could be discovered (or
acquired) by the organization improving productivity and e!ciency, positively influencing
the NGO’s type. Some possibility of such a shake-up is always possible in an NGO, and the
consequences of these internal changes are often unobservable to donors.
To focus our analysis on reputational dynamics, we assume that an NGO is primar-
ily interested in maintaining its funding, rather than achieving successful policy outcomes.
Obviously this assumption abstracts from empirical reality, but it is appropriate for several
reasons. First, it allows us to isolate the e"ects of reputation from other potential motivating
factors for NGO behavior. Second, NGOs do care about funding, as they rely upon it for
survival. Without funding, an NGO would not even have a chance to pursue policy goals. In
this way, the assumption that NGOs care about funding is similar to the common assumption
that politicians care primarily about staying in o!ce. Finally, one can indirectly incorporate
the role of policy salience into our model through the cost term. In particular, one would
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expect that NGOs that care more about the relevant issue would have lower marginal costs
of e"ort than those that do not. Thus, as long as one does not assume that altruism or
salience leads NGOs to always pursue high e"ort, our model can take into account both the
monetary and policy interests that influence NGO decision making.
Our theoretical model includes two players, a donor and an NGO. The NGO can be one
of two types (!): competent (C) or incompetent (I). Competent NGOs have the ability to
pursue successful policies, while incompetent NGOs do not. At the beginning of the game,
Nature chooses the type of the NGO. The NGO is competent with probability " " (0, 1) and
incompetent with probability 1# ". The NGO learns its type, while the donor does not.
In each period, the donor decides whether to fund the NGO. If the donor chooses not to
fund, the NGO ceases to exist and the game ends. If the donor funds, it transfers a lump
sum, f , to the organization. A competent NGO then decides the level of e"ort to put into
achieving a successful policy outcome in that period. In particular, it can expend a high
level of e"ort (H) at a cost e > 0 or a low (L) level of e"ort at no cost. To allow for the
possibility that the NGO would be willing to exert high e"ort, we assume that the cost of
high e"ort does not exceed the per-period funding available from the donor (i.e., e $ f). We
assume that an incompetent NGO can only expend a low level of e"ort. The donor does not
observe the amount of e"ort expended by the NGO.
After the NGO chooses the level of e"ort, Nature then determines the policy outcome for
the period, which can be either successful or unsuccessful. If the NGO chooses a high level
of e"ort, there is a successful outcome with probability # and an unsuccessful outcome with
probability 1##. For simplicity, we assume that low e"ort always results in an unsuccessful
outcome.2 The policy outcome is observed by all players. We assume that donors receive a
payo" of 1 for a successful outcome and 0 for an unsuccessful outcome. NGOs do not receive
any direct payo" for the policy outcome.
2Though the analysis would be more complex, we expect that one would obtain similar substantive results
in a model in which success is possible after low e!ort, as long as the probability of success is higher after
high e!ort than after low e!ort.
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Play continues until the donor decides not to fund the NGO. In all subsequent periods
after the first period, we assume that there is the possibility of an exogenous “shake-up” in
the NGO with probability $. For example, there could be a change in personnel or leadership
of the NGO. In the event of a shake-up, Nature redetermines the NGO’s type. In particular,
after a shakeup, the NGO is competent with probability " and incompetent with probability
1#". We assume that any shakeup is unobserved by the donor. Finally, we assume that the
donor is myopic, so it only cares about its payo" in the current period (i.e., it has a discount
factor of 0). We expect that donors will be interested in getting a return on their investment
in a given period before they consider whether to renew an NGO’s funding. On the other
hand, since the NGO is concerned with survival, it discounts future payo"s with a discount
factor % " (0, 1).
Given that we assume that the donor is myopic, we limit our analysis to Markov strategies,
which only depend upon payo"-relevant histories. Let µ be the donor’s belief that the NGO
is competent, and let &(µ) be the probability that a competent NGO will exert high e"ort
given that belief. Then the donor expects to receive a successful policy outcome in a given
period with probability p(µ) = µ&#. Since the donor is myopic and the utility of a successful
outcome is 1, it will choose to fund if p(µ) % f .
Consider a situation in which competent NGOs always exert high e"ort. In this case,
policy outcomes can provide information about the NGO’s competence. The donor’s poste-
rior belief that the NGO is competent in a given period is a function of its prior belief, the
policy outcome in the previous period, and the probability of a shake-up. After a successful
policy outcome, the posterior belief is:
µs = 1# $(1# "). (1)
Since only competent NGOs can be successful, a successful outcome in the previous period
indicates that the NGO was competent in the previous period. However, there is some
probability, $(1# "), that a shakeup in the current period will result in the the NGO being
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incompetent. Thus, if $ > 0, the donor can never know with certainty whether the NGO is
competent in the current period. On the other hand, the donor’s posterior belief that the
NGO is competent after an unsuccessful outcome is:
µu = (1# $)
!
(1# #)µ









If 0 < µ < 1, µs > µu. Thus, as long as there is uncertainty about the NGO’s competence,
the donor’s belief that the NGO is competent is higher after a successful policy outcome
than after an unsuccessful outcome. In addition, it can be shown that the donor’s belief
that the NGO is competent decreases after an unsuccessful outcome. If we let µ̂ be the fixed
point at which µu = µ (such that 0 < µ̂ < 1), it follows that the µ̂ is the lowest possible
belief about the NGO’s competence that the donor can have.
If there is no possibility of a shakeup (i.e., $ = 0), a competent NGO will never choose
to exert high e"ort. To see why this is the case, consider the situation in which the donor
believes the NGO to be competent (µ = 1). In this case, µs = µu = 1. Because the donor
assumes that any unsuccessful outcome is due to bad luck, rather than low e"ort, it will
believe the NGO to be competent regardless of the policy outcome. Thus, the NGO has
no incentive to choose high e"ort since it would be funded in any case. In addition, there
cannot be an equilibrium in which the competent NGO chooses low e"ort when µ = 1 but
chooses high e"ort at other values of µ. In such an equilibrium, the donor would not fund if
µ = 1. Since µs = 1, the NGO knows that it will not be funded in the next period if there is
a successful outcome. Given this, the NGO would have no incentive to pay the cost of high
e"ort because it would cease to exist after a successful policy outcome. Thus, as Mailath
and Samuelson (1998, 2001) show, separation between competent and incompetent agents
can only occur if there is perpetual uncertainty about the agent’s type. In our model, this
implies that high e"ort by competent NGOs can only occur in equilibrium if $ > 0. The
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next proposition identifies the conditions under which there will be high e"ort.
Proposition 1. If the cost of e!ort is su"ciently small, $ > 0, and f > µ̂#, there exists a
Markov perfect equilibrium in which a competent NGO always chooses high e!ort.
The formal proof of the proposition can be found in the appendix. The intuition is as
follows. If competent NGOs will exert high e"ort, the donor will be more willing to fund
competent NGOs than incompetent NGOs. Thus, the donor’s equilibrium strategy will
depend upon its belief that the NGO is competent. In particular, there will be a cutpoint,
µ!, such that the donor will fund if µ % µ! and not fund otherwise. Due to the possibility of
a shake-up in each period, the donor can never know the NGO’s type with certainty. Since
successful outcomes are only possible with high e"ort and only competent types exert high
e"ort, the donor’s belief that the NGO is competent is higher after a successful outcome
than after an unsuccessful outcome. Because the NGO would prefer to maintain its funding,
it has an incentive to prevent the donor’s belief from falling below µ!. Since, in expectation,
higher e"ort will produce a higher belief than lower e"ort, the NGO will pursue a high level
of e"ort if the cost is su!ciently low.
The theoretical model provides insight into the potential role that reputation can play in
the relationship between donors and NGOs. One can consider the parameter µ, the donor’s
belief that the NGO is competent, to be the NGO’s reputation. Because donors cannot
directly observe the competence of an NGO, they must make their funding decisions based
upon an NGO’s reputation. In particular, donors are only willing to fund NGOs with good
reputations (µ % µ!). If an NGO’s reputation falls too low, a donor will cut o" its funding.
In the model, an NGO’s reputation is based upon its record of policy successes. Because
donors cannot directly observe all of the actions of an NGO, they do not know the precise
e"ort level that the NGO puts into its activities. However, they can observe whether the
NGO’s e"orts lead to successful policy outcomes. For example, a donor might not know how
much e"ort a NGO put into mediating a civil war, but it can observe whether the mediation
led to a peace agreement. Thus, a donor updates its belief about the competence of an NGO
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after each policy success or failure. If success is only possible when a competent NGO exerts
a high level of e"ort, an NGO can quickly develop an excellent reputation after a policy
success. On the other hand, a series of policy failures would gradually erode the NGO’s
reputation. After a su!cient number of failures in a row, the donor will begin to believe
that the NGO is incompetent and will cut o" the NGO’s funding.
These reputation dynamics thus influence the behavior of NGOs. To maintain its funding
from donors, a competent NGO will attempt to build and maintain a good reputation by
putting more e"ort into activities aimed at achieving the donor’s policy goals. It expects
that such e"orts will lead to more successful policy outcomes, which will in turn increase the
donor’s belief that NGO is competent. However, according to the model, for such reputa-
tional concerns to influence the behavior of NGOs, there must always be some uncertainty
on the part of the donor. If the donor knows with certainty that an NGO is competent, there
is nothing for the NGO to prove, as there is no outcome that would decrease the donor’s
belief that it is competent. However, if there is always a possibility that a shake-up in the
organization—due to sta" turnover or new challenges in the international policy arena—can
a"ect the NGO’s ability to pursue successful policies, the donor can never know with cer-
tainty the competence of the NGO. Thus, the NGO will always have something to prove to
its donors and will continue to have an incentive to put a high level of e"ort into its activities
to maintain a good reputation.
This reputation process can provide a useful accountability mechanism for donors. Given
the information asymmetries inherent in donor-NGO relations, donors aim to avoid problems
of adverse selection, in which they fund incompetent NGOs, and moral hazard, in which
NGOs fail to put su!cient e"ort into the donor’s policy goals. From the perspective of the
donors, however, identifying policy successes can be very di!cult. The overall objectives of
international NGOs are often very grandiose, and achievement of these long term goals is
not arrived at quickly. Evaluating signals of competence and e"ort throughout the process
is important to ensure donors their money is not being wasted and that additional financial
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support would be put to good use. For this reason, donors may look for tangible positive
achievements that are more feasible in shorter time windows. These shorter time windows
would allow donors to more frequently observe and evaluate the e"ectiveness and competency
of an NGO, updating their beliefs and thus their funding decisions accordingly.
However, while the reputational accountability mechanism can help overcome problems
such as adverse selection and moral hazard, it can also create perverse incentives for NGOs.
In order to maintain funding, competent NGOs must put e"ort into activities that will lead
to tangible policy successes observable to donors. While these short-term successes can
provide signals of a group’s competence, they do not necessarily indicate progress the long-
term goals of the organization. For example, an NGO focused on health care in a developing
country may promote the number of successful medical procedures that it is has performed
in a country as a signal of its competence. However, this metric provides no information on
the organization’s impact on the overall level of health in the country. Moreover, because the
organization must signal competence to its donors, it may focus its attention on maximizing
the number of medical procedures performed rather than pursuing other activities, such as
preventative health programs, that do not produce tangible short-term results but might be
more e"ective at achieving the group’s long-term goals. In this way, short-term goals can
override long term foci, leading an NGO to engage in behavior that appears to impede the
“big-picture” progress of the group.
We call the situation described above a reputation trap. To survive, NGOs must contin-
ually focus on the task of demonstrating competence. However, in doing so, they divert their
attention away from achieving their long term goals. The trap is not created by incompetence
or irrationality; instead, it is the result of rational decisions made by donors and NGOs. In
attempting to resolve one set of principal-agent problems, donors inadvertently create a new
set of perverse incentives for NGOs. As such, reputations can become a double-edged sword
for NGOs, simultaneously providing the information donors need to commit resources while
constraining the NGO from maximizing its pursuit of its policy goals. In the next section, we
15
illustrate the reputational dynamics identified in our theoretical model with a focus on three
types of NGO activity: international crisis mediation, water improvement, and ameliorating
poverty.
Empirical Illustrations
We now turn to three empirical cases that highlight the various dynamics and implications
of our theoretical argument.3 In the first case we examine the Center for Humanitarian
Dialogue’s e"orts to mediate a civil conflict between the Free Aceh Movement and the In-
donesian military. This case highlights the importance of reputation early on in the existence
of an NGO, and the structural pressure on the NGO to identify and report tangible accom-
plishments. Our second illustration focuses on water NGOs and their e"orts to improve
water access. The activities of these NGOs show how the need for reporting quantifiable
short-term results can undermine the ability to achieve durable policy progress. Lastly, we
trace the evolution of the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee and shed light on a
strategy that NGOs can use to potentially mitigate the reputation trap.
Mediation: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and conflict resolu-
tion in Aceh, 1999-2003
The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue is a nongovernmental organization that began its
operations in August of 1999. Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, HDC works across
the globe “to develop and strengthen a universal, intercultural and multidisciplinary dia-
logue in which all players concerned by humanitarian issues can exchange their experiences;
and to devise and promote sustainable solutions to humanitarian problems” (Barakat, Con-
nolly and Large 2002, 6). HDC strives to achieve its humanitarian goals first and foremost
through conflict mediation. As a non-profit organization, HDC’s mission is made possible
3These cases should not be considered as tests of hypotheses derived from our theory (as they were not
selected quasi-randomly), but rather as targeted illustrations of the abstract model.
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by the support of donors ranging from countries such as Norway, Switzerland, and Canada
to other organizations such as the United Nations Development Program, the International
Committee of the Red Cross, and the MacArthur Foundation (HDC Annual Report 2009).
A brief look at HDC’s role in Aceh illustrates how HDC worked to establish and improve
its reputation as a qualified and capable conflict mediator. Although HDC has been the key
mediator in a number of civil conflicts, we focus on the Acehnese conflict for two primary
reasons. First, the mediation e"orts in Aceh were HDC’s first mediation attempt. Without
previous experiences to bias or influence its reputation, we are able to assess the e"ect that
their early actions and successes in Aceh had on their ability to develop a reputation for
competence. Second, HDC was the only mediator active in Aceh at the time. Thus, we are
able to attribute any successes and failures that occurred during those years to HDC.
The Indonesian region of Aceh has experienced continuous conflict since the middle of
the 20th century. Social cleavages led to a major rebellion between 1953 and 1962, known as
Darul Islam. The Darul Islam rebellion sought Acehnese regional autonomy over education,
religion, and traditional laws. Although the central government granted autonomous status
to the region in 1959, autonomy was never a reality in practice. Thus, in 1976, the Free
Aceh Movement (GAM) rose to prominence and declared Acehnese independence (Huber
2004). The ideology of GAM is one of national liberation; specifically, GAM aimed to
free Aceh from the political control of the foreign regime in Jakarta (Schulze 2004, 6).
Violence continued throughout the region and then intensified following the resignation of
the authoritarian Indonesian President Suharto in 1998. By 2000, the Acehnese conflict had
attracted the attention of mediators who hoped to finally bring peace to the region (Huber
2004). Because the conflict in Aceh was secessionist in nature, HDC faced a particularly
challenging mediation. HDC’s drive to create a competent and successful image as a mediator
influenced the very presence of HDC in Aceh. HDC cherry-picked Aceh over other conflicts
because of the potential this particular conflict held for building a reputation. HDC had
originally considered intervention in East Timor, but choose Aceh as “the density of aid
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agencies already present in East Timor following its independence led the HDC to seek a
di"erent venue” (Leary 2004, 315). Furthermore, HDC wanted to mediate a salient conflict;
if this particular conflict could be successfully mediated, then the rewards to HDC would
be paramount. HDC also attempted to signal high e"ort levels in the way that its sta"
comported themselves throughout the mediation process. Accounts from interviews indicate
that the sta" of HDC went above and beyond the call of duty to foster a successful mediation
environment (Leary 2004). Louisa Chan-Boegli was one of the top conflict mediators for
HDC throughout its work in Indonesia. Interviews reveal that she would regularly pick
up members of each side of negotiations from the airport herself, eat dinner with them on
alternating evenings, and stay up into the early morning working with the Indonesian groups
(326). In the eyes of donors, however, signals of high e"ort like these are only cheap talk.
While they are indicators of increased time spent with the disputants, donors cannot know if
these e"orts were sustained throughout the negotiations or only intermittently for increased
publicity. Moreover, increased time with the disputants does not necessarily indicate that
the mediators were capable of using this time to e"ectively bring the conflict to a resolution.
Tangible results in the form of public negotiations, agreements, and ceasefires are of greater
importance to donors in terms of evaluating the competence of mediators.
When HDC entered the country in 1999, it focused e"orts on creating a ceasefire. In
2000, HDC was able to establish just that; the ceasefire agreed upon in 2000 is known as the
“humanitarian pause” and held sporadically until 2001. In 2002, HDC facilitated a major
breakthrough with the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) (Huber
2004). COHA broke down by May 2003 (Morfit 2007, 112). Despite HDC’s determination, it
left the Acehnese conflict without mediating a lasting peace agreement. Although the peace
ultimately did not last in Indonesia, the agreements represented positive progress perceived
by the international community and donors as policy successes. The humanitarian pause, for
example, was a success because it signaled that HDC had been able to organize face-to-face
dialogue between belligerent groups and generate cooperation, however fleeting. Donors,
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viewing the ceasefire as a tangible form of success, credited HDC as a competent mediator
that was worthy of continued funding.4 COHA was an even greater breakthrough for HDC’s
reputation as a competent mediator. This second agreement was a more comprehensive
ceasefire agreement that included provisions for demilitarization, all-inclusive dialogues re-
garding autonomy, and provincial election in Aceh (Huber 2004, vii). Norway’s donations
to HDC during this period supports this argument and demonstrates how donors responded
to HDC’s results in Aceh. As HDC was a nascent organization when it first decided to
mediate in Aceh, Norway’s funding in 1999 was limited. Only after HDC secured the hu-
manitarian pause in 2000 did Norway begin providing additional funding for monitoring and
humanitarian purposes.
HDC continues to maintain a reputation as a competent mediation NGO today, in spite
of the initial di!culties it experienced in Aceh. This case highlights that organizations like
HDC are able to spin positive steps, however fleeting, as indicators of success. Competent
organizations do not always achieve success in absolute terms, but they do exert e"ort to
achieve shorter-term tangible results and demonstrate to donors that they are worthy of con-
tinued support. Donors, whose funding generally comes on an annual basis, are encouraged
by positive signals and renew funding even if the positive signals do not ultimately result
in overall objective completion. These incentives to demonstrate competence can sometimes
encourage NGOs to prioritize short-term policy progress over their broader objectives. In
the case of HDC, the preferences of the organization and the donors aligned so that while
HDC was concerned with achieving policy success quickly, it did not have to sacrifice its
long-term goals to achieve these short-term signals. These conflicting short and long-term
incentives, however, can potentially hurt the NGOs overall mission, as seen in the case of
water NGOs discussed next.
4HDC’s Annual Report from 2001 supports the conclusion that donors reacted positively to the “suc-
cessful” signal created by the humanitarian pause. Funding jumped from CHF 4,624,300 in 2000 to CHF
5,756,000 in 2001.
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Water: Counting boreholes at the expense of sustainable water
infrastructure
Increasing access to clean water, one of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, is at the
forefront of many policymakers’ and human rights groups’ agendas. Unfortunately, NGO
concerns about donor perceptions of competence and the myopic evaluation of NGO success
by donors prevent NGOs from focusing on long-term sustainable solutions to increasing
clean water access worldwide. Instead, these NGOs are trapped in a system of short-term
solutions that improve water access temporarily but do not address obstacles to long-term
water availability. We focus in particular on one widely used program of water NGOs:
borehole5 drilling.
As highlighted by Calow et al. (1997), the best source of clean water in many areas that
struggle with water availability is ground water. Ground water tends to be rather abundant,
annually replenished, and, perhaps most importantly, naturally protected (244). Boreholes,
therefore, provide a quick, low-cost means to increase the number of water access points
in a region by taking advantage of pre-existing groundwater reserves. New boreholes have
several immediate advantages. More proximate access decreases the burden of attaining
water by reducing the number of hours spent walking to an access point. Furthermore,
by making water more accessible, boreholes help improve health outcomes, especially for
children (Carter, Tyrrel and Howsam 1999).
While boreholes help achieve NGOs’ goals in the short-term, they are very ine!cient as
improper planning and maintenance result in high rates of borehole failure. Boreholes fail for
a number of reasons, including groundwater drought, contamination, and broken equipment.
According to a UNICEF report, in 1995 twenty-five percent of wells and boreholes in Malawi
were out of operation, malfunctioning, or dry (referenced in Calow et al. 1997). In Mali,
the World Vision International initiative to build boreholes had a success rate of forty-one
percent if success is defined as percent of boreholes in use by the community. When success
5A borehole is a small-diameter well drilled to access water.
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is defined as the percent of boreholes reaching the World Health Organization’s minimum
flow rates, this success rate drops to a mere ten percent (Gleitsmann, Kroma and Steenhuis
2007). Calow et al. (1997) argue that many of these failures are a result of predictable
variations in groundwater drought vulnerability and that boreholes that fail as a result of
equipment problems could be more easily and more quickly repaired if information on the
location and functionality of existing boreholes was gathered and updated.
The long term e!ciency of the water projects could therefore be improved if common
factors that lead to borehole failure, such as groundwater drought, were accounted for in
designing water programs. For example, in Malawi, boreholes were frequently built in areas
vulnerable to groundwater drought. As these vulnerabilities were unaccounted for by the
NGOs implementing the programs on the ground, when drought hit, many boreholes dried
up. New boreholes constructed in response to the drought were also poorly planned and
soon failed when the return of rain caused them to sink (Calow et al. 1997, 250). Thus,
additional planning and research by NGOs before beginning new projects could lead to more
sustainable, long-term program success.
Despite these known short-comings, tens of thousands of wells and boreholes are added
every year in Africa alone (Skinner 2009). Program evaluations conducted by WaterAid, a
leading international water NGO, acknowledge the need for sustainability, but the evalua-
tions still focus on the generation of new access points (WaterAid 2010). Due in part to
adverse incentives generated by the donor-NGO relationship, NGOs continue to concentrate
their e"orts on digging new boreholes instead of diverting resources to research and main-
tenance of existing holes. NGOs do not prioritize data collection because attracting donor
support for such activities is di!cult (Calow et al. 1997, 255). NGOs need to generate tan-
gible progress toward their objectives that will signal their competency. Building boreholes
generates quantifiable benefits with verifiable indicators of success. Data collection and re-
search improve the chances for long-term improvements in water availability but are much
more di!cult for NGOs to use as signals of policy success (and thus of their competency).
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Water NGOs therefore prefer to deal with immediate, tangible problems with immediate,
tangible solutions. Unfortunately, as NGOs have limited resources, a focus on increasing
access points often precludes investment in more preventive or sustainable measures. Thus,
water NGOs have found themselves in a trap where to signal policy successes to donors they
are stuck engaging in short-term behavior that has some positive e"ects for their policy ob-
jectives but prevents them from achieving greater long-term progress in making clean water
available worldwide.
Leading NGOs, like WaterAid, are trying to increase the sustainability of their projects
and at least partially escape this trap. WaterAid’s 2012 annual report highlights work being
done in Nicaragua to train members of the community in which boreholes are drilled to
maintain and repair these holes (WaterAid 2012). These e"orts, however, are still restricted
to easily quantifiable tasks. Their report cites numbers like “13 communities trained” and “46
water points rehabilitated” in Nicaragua (20). These e"orts are moves in the right direction
but are not su!cient to overcome the trap entirely. The World Vision International e"orts
in Malawi included community involvement and training but still saw such low success rates
(Gleitsmann, Kroma and Steenhuis 2007). Training and maintenance after the borehole is
dug can only help solve some of the problems with boreholes outlined above. Repair cannot
resolve groundwater drought or sunk wells. More research on the optimal locations of these
boreholes before they are dug is needed to really achieve sustainability.
Despite positive e"orts by water NGOs, escaping the trap might require external as-
sistance. Fortunately, groups like The International NGO Training and Research Center
(INTRAC) have taken an interest in NGO performance, especially helping NGOs evaluate
their e"orts based upon programs’ long-term impacts. Adams (2001), for example, considers
water NGOs and finds that performance evaluations often described the NGOs’ activities
rather than analyzing the e"ectiveness of these activities, essentially highlighting the current
standard practice of NGOs to evaluate programs’ short-term progress instead of long-term
value. Adams acknowledges that e"ectiveness is often di!cult to identify and that many
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factors influence “success.” Evaluating programs based upon long-term outcomes is a chal-
lenge. While acknowledging these challenges, Adams proceeds to begin establishing protocols
and methods that would enable water NGOs to overcome these challenges. If groups like
INTRAC can help generate metrics for water NGOs to quantify their programs’ long-term
impact, then NGOs concerned with the sustainability of their e"orts will be able to sig-
nal long-term policy successes to donors in a tangible way. This could help NGOs signal
competence without sacrificing long-term objectives for short-term gains.
Development: The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
BRAC is a Bangladesh-based development NGO that is recognized as one of the largest
organizations of its kind in the world (Chowdhury and Bhuiya 2001, 371). In discussing
the development and activities of BRAC below, we shift to a more optimistic view of NGO
reputation. While the dynamics of the NGO-donor relationship often create incentives for
NGOs to pursue short-term goals in order to signal success to donors, BRAC demonstrates
that NGOs have opportunities to mitigate the e"ects of the funding trap. After years of
success and growth for BRAC, the organization has been able to begin self-financing most
of its programs. As such, BRAC demonstrates not only the dynamics of reputation but also
the potential for NGOs to mitigate the reputation trap by reducing donor dependency.
Founded in 1972 by Fazle Hasan Abed, BRAC emerged following Bangladesh’s War of In-
dependence. As its original name—the Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee—
suggests, BRAC’s initial goal was to aid and rehabilitate the millions of refugees who were
flooding back to the war-torn country from neighboring India. By 1973, however, BRAC
changed its name to the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. With this shift, BRAC
indicated that the organization had new and wider goals. More recently, BRAC has adopted
the motto, “Building resources across communities” (Smillie 2009, 3). Since its initial name
change in 1973, BRAC’s primary objectives have been the broad-based alleviation of poverty
and empowerment of impoverished groups (BRAC 2013).
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From an organization of less than ten employees in 1972 (Smillie 2009, 25), BRAC has
grown to employ over ninety thousand people (BRAC 2013). BRAC’s tremendous growth
provides a compelling illustration for our theory of reputation. At the time of BRAC’s foun-
dation, numerous relief organizations were flocking to the newly independent Bangladesh.
BRAC, however, stood out from the crowd in its e"orts. After over forty years of work,
BRAC maintains a strong reputation. Since 2002, in fact, the organization has been able to
expand its work outside of Bangladesh to other developing countries such as Pakistan and
Sierra Leone. Looking back at the organization’s early years allows us to examine how it
established a reputation for competency to sustain donor funding and grow to become one of
the largest NGOs in the world. Because BRAC is such a large organization that is involved
in a broad spectrum of development activities, we focus on two specific programs: BRAC’s
initial relief e"ort in Sulla and its non-formal primary education (NFPE) program.
BRAC’s rehabilitation e"orts in Sulla, a remote area in northeastern Bangladesh, serve as
a compelling example because this was the organization’s first endeavor. Thus, BRAC was a
clean slate on which we are able to evaluate the development of a reputation. Additionally,
BRAC had a single primary donor at the outset, Oxfam. We are able to track Oxfam’s
reaction to BRAC’s success in Sulla to show the dynamics of reputation in the donor-NGO
relationship. In early 1972, BRAC applied for and received funding from Oxfam to assist
the resettlement of refugees in Sulla. BRAC was at the forefront of relief and reconstruction
e"orts in the region (Korten 1980). By October of 1972, Abed wrote a report for Oxfam
to describe what BRAC had accomplished with donor funds in the organization’s first nine
months. While BRAC’s goal was to build 10,500 homes, it had managed to build more than
14,000. Moreover, BRAC o"ered to return leftover money to Oxfam.6 BRAC’s first endeavor
in Sulla, a clear success for the new NGO, signaled competence to their main donor, Oxfam,
and spurred immediate additional funding from Oxfam to take part in further development
6The gesture of o!ering money back to Oxfam shocked the donor. Oxfam allowed BRAC to keep the
money and use it on future projects (a signal that the donor, Oxfam, perceived BRAC as a competent
organization) (Smillie 2009, 26).
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projects (Smillie 2009, 25-27). This success also encouraged BRAC to broaden its goal from
resettlement to sustainable community development.
The second example from BRAC’s history is its NFPE program. Established in 1985,
BRAC’s primary goal in pursuing the NFPE program was to increase access to basic educa-
tion in unreached populations and to improve the quality of that education (BRAC 2013).
This second example illustrates the dynamics of reputation building; the NFPE program
grew as BRAC’s reputation solidified. In 1985 BRAC opened twenty-two one-room school-
houses in an attempt to extend quality education to children from the poorest families in
the country, those “unreachable” children who had been deprived of education because of
poverty or gender (Lovell and Fatema 1989, 8).7 In classes capped at thirty-three children,
students are trained so that they have the ability to enter secondary school (Archer 1994,
225). The school experiment was deemed a success, and by 1987, BRAC was ready to ex-
pand the program to 642 schools (Smillie 2009). The rapid growth of the program continued
as BRAC continued to demonstrate tangible successes in the education sector. BRAC has
consistently signaled positive policy progress by highlighting its low drop out rates and high
graduation rates. By 1995, for example, BRAC had opened 19,000 schools, graduating more
than 500,000 children (Smillie 2009, 162). Moreover, NFPE has had just a two percent
drop out rate and approximately ninety percent of graduates continue on to formal primary
schools (Archer 1994, 225).8 By emphasizing these tangible successes to donors, BRAC
has signaled its competence in the education sector thus ensuring continuous and increased
funding from its donor consortium and the continued expansion of NFPE.9
The aforementioned examples of BRAC’s actions in Bangladesh provide an illustration
of how an NGO interacts with donors to establish and develop a reputation. As a new
organization in Sulla, BRAC surpassed its goals as set forth to Oxfam and finished under-
7Criteria for entering the program include having illiterate parents who own less than 0.5 hectares of land
(0.5 hectares is equal to about 1.24 acres) (Archer 1994, 225).
8This drop out rate can be compared to one that is close to fifty percent by class 5 and over eighty percent
by class 10 for those who attend government-run public schools (BRAC 2013).
9Donors for BRAC’s NFPE program include the Department for International Development (DFID), the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the European Commission (Boyle 2002).
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budget. This action illustrated organizational competence, secured a second year of increased
funding, and gave BRAC the opportunity to continue its work toward poverty-reduction and
development. The example of the NFPE program illustrates how reputations are dynamic
and can grow over time. As BRAC used tangible outcomes, such as graduation rates, to
signal its capabilities and competence to donors, it was able to vastly expand its program.
Growth has occurred as a result of donor support; BRAC secured increased donor support
because donors recognized these successes as signals of BRAC’s competence.
BRAC, in fact, has been so successful over the years at illustrating competence and im-
plementing e"ective development programs that the organization has been able to transition
away from a donor dependent financial system. While many donor-NGO relationships create
a trap in which NGOs must pursue short-term tangible goals that demonstrate competence
to secure funding at the expense of broader long-term aspirations, BRAC has been able to
remove itself from this trap. BRAC’s leadership realized “early on that self-reliance for its
target groups and self-reliance for the organization went hand in hand” (Viravaidya and
Hayssen 2001, 9). Thus, BRAC’s programs “that generate surpluses above their ongoing
costs are used to cross-subsidize other valued programs” (Viravaidya and Hayssen 2001, 9).
More specifically, BRAC operates eighteen financially profitable social enterprises that
have helped to mitigate the reputation trap. The first of these enterprises, Aarong, was
established in 1978 to market hand-spun silk on a larger scale.10 Aarong has been a means
of empowering and employing impoverished women and artisans, and it has also brought
profits to the organization which have been used to fund the expansion of Aarong, BRAC’s
other social enterprises, and many of BRAC’s development programs. Over the years, BRAC
has expanded its social enterprises to include industries such as dairy, fisheries, poultry, salt,
and printing (BRAC 2013). BRAC’s enterprises serve a dual purpose of development and
profit. The enterprises have created hundreds of thousands of jobs and opportunities for the
poor (Smillie 2009, 250). Moreover, the BRAC enterprises have been very e"ective in cutting
10Aarong has expanded vastly since its inception and now operates 12 retail chain outlets across Bangladesh
(BRAC 2013).
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BRAC’s reliance on donors. By 2011, only twenty-four percent of BRAC’s expenditures came
from donors as opposed to one hundred percent in 1980 (BRAC 2013). Because BRAC is less
reliant on donors, it has been able to partake in longer-term initiatives to further development
and poverty reduction in Bangladesh. BRAC’s education programs, for example, are now
funded and planned on a five-year basis, as opposed to the initial two-year plan of the NFPE.
Optimistically, then, the BRAC case demonstrates that NGOs do have an exit option from
the adverse incentives caused by the donor-NGO relationship.
Conclusion
Our central conclusion is connected to the fundamental principal-agent relationship between
donors and NGOs. The inability of donors to accurately and consistently observe competence
in the NGOs they support creates a political hurdle for NGOs as they seek to maintain
funding in order to pursue their policy goals. Because an NGO’s competence is both private
information and dynamic over time, NGOs are forced to divert energy and resources to
developing and maintaining a reputation for competence. This incentive can cause NGOs to
invest higher levels of e"ort in policy activities that will consistently deliver tangible evidence
of progress in order to credibly signal competence to their donors.
One interesting implication of the model is the rational explanation of what may ap-
pear to be wasteful or short-sighted behavior on the part of NGOs. These organizations
are routinely criticized for working on what appear to be small, temporary, and perhaps
even counterproductive accomplishments. In the area of international mediation, for exam-
ple, signing a cease-fire agreement is a far cry from implementing the agreement to obtain
peace. Nevertheless, the peace agreement is championed by the mediator as a mediation
success story. Similarly, environmental NGOs may organize multi-party talks that pro-
duce non-binding agreements that unravel almost as quickly as they are produced, yet such
agreements are announced with much fanfare and seemingly naive expectations of compli-
ance. Water NGOs may find themselves counting on temporary solutions as they struggle
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to gather enough resources to tackle their long term goals of sanitation, water quality, and
access. These behaviors may simply be an e"ort by NGOs to communicate meaningful sig-
nals of competence to their donors. Ironically, even when these activities detract from the
overall mission of the NGO, it will feel compelled to divert resources to consistent and public
demonstrations of tangible progress in an e"ort to preserve funding. In other words, an NGO
can find itself in a reputation trap.
By stepping away from the traditional focus between NGO and its clients and shifting
our perspective to the role of reputation in the relationship between donor and NGO, we
o"er a perspective that sheds new light on NGO behavior. Without making heroic or cynical
assumptions about the intentions of NGOs, we demonstrate that these organizations balance
their normative goals with the strategic survival imperatives that emerge from the NGO-
donor relationship. This balancing act has important implications for policy behavior.
Overcoming this tradeo" cannot be accomplished strictly through improvements in trans-
parency and accountability (the two most common calls for NGO reform), but it would be a
mistake to conclude that this structural problem cannot be solved. As the BRAC illustration
shows us, one path NGOs can take to avoid the constant demands to maintain one’s rep-
utation involves changing the organizations dependence on donors (i.e., self-sustainability).
Another path could be to try to convince donors that the NGO’s competence is established
and invulnerable to change. Reputation stability, if possible, would relieve the NGO’s need to
re-demonstrate its competence to donors. This condition may be most likely to be achieved
by changing the duration of funding agreements. Longer funding cycles give NGOs more
time to accomplish their goals without focusing on survival. Just as a U.S. senator has more
freedom to take political risks and focus on long term problems than her counterparts in the
House of Representatives, NGOs with a multi-year funding guarantee have more leeway than
those who face yearly renewals. Such a solution of course introduces potential accountability
problems, but we argue that this is at least a tradeo" that needs to become a part of the
policy discussion.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Assume that $ > 0 and f/# > µ̂. Consider the case where the competent NGO
always chooses high e"ort. In a Markov perfect equilibrium, strategies are only dependent
upon payo" relevant histories, so they will be a function of the donor’s belief about the
NGO’s competence (µ). The donor will prefer to fund if p(µ) = µ# % f . Thus, donor
will fund in a given period if µ % f/# & µ! and not fund otherwise. In any period in
which donor’s belief is less than µ!, the NGO will not be funded and will cease to exist.
Since f/# > µ̂, there exist potential beliefs Let kj be a state in which after j consecutive
unsuccessful outcomes, the donor will not fund the NGO, and let Kj be the set of all kj for a
given j. (For example, if the current state is k1, then µ % µ! and µu < µ!.) Let ks be a state
in which there was a successful outcome in the previous period. Then, {K0, K1, K2, . . . , Ks}
is a partition of the true state space, the interval of possible values of µ: [µ̂, 1 # $(1 # ")].
Given the donor’s strategy, a Markov strategy for the NGO can be defined as a function
& : {k0, k1, k2, . . . , ks} ' [0, 1].
Consider k0. Given the competent NGO’s strategy, the continuation values are:
VC(k1) = #e + %[1# $(1# ")]#VC(ks) + %$(1# ")#VI(ks), (3)
VI(k1) = 0. (4)
For k1, the continuation values are:
VC(k1) = f # e+ %[1# $(1# ")]#VC(ks) + %$(1# ")#VI(ks), (5)
VI(k1) = f. (6)
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For j > 1, the continuation values are:
VC(kj) = f # e+ %[1# $(1# ")][#VC(ks) + (1# #)VC(kj"1)]
+ %$(1# ")[#VI(ks) + (1# #)VI(kj"1)], (7)
VI(kj) = f + %(1# $")VI(kj"1) + %$"VC(kj"1). (8)
For j > 1, given kj, NGOs will receive funding with certainty in the next period regardless
of the policy outcome. Thus, V! (kj) > V! (k1) for j > 1 and ! " {C, I}. Since V! (k2) >
V! (k1), it follows that V! (k3) > V! (k2). By this same logic, one can show that V! (kj) >
V! (kj"1) for j $ s.
Now consider the competent NGO’s strategy. For k0 and k1, its value for deviating in a
given period and choosing low e"ort is VC(k0|L) = 0 and VC(k1|L) = f , respectively. Thus,
in both cases, the competent NGO will choose high e"ort if VC(kj) % VC(kj |L), or
e $ %[1# $(1# ")]#VC(ks) + %$(1# ")#VI(ks). (9)
For j > 1,
VC(kj) = f + %[1# $(1# ")]VC(kj"1) + %$(1# ")VI(kj"1). (10)
Thus, the competent NGO will choose high e"ort if
e $ %[1# $(1# ")]#[VC(ks)# VC(kj"1)] + %$(1# ")#[VI(ks)# VI(kj"1)]. (11)
Since V! (kj) > V! (kj"1) for j $ s and ! " {C, I}, the right hand side of (11) is always
positive and decreasing in j. Thus, if the competent NGO will prefer to choose high e"ort
in ks, it will choose high e"ort in all other states. Thus, the competent NGO will choose
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high e"ort if e $ e!, where
e! = %[1# $(1# ")]#[VC(ks)# VC(ks"1)] + %$(1# ")#[VI(ks)# VI(ks"1)] > 0. (12)
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